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Abstract  
Strategic resilience concerns broad societal issues and long-term processes to successfully handle severe 
disturbances such as crises and war. This paper presents a case study of a Swedish exploration project 
to investigate how civil defence interests may influence land-use planning through legislation on 
national interests. The project brought together two disparate areas and involved collaborative 
exploration through representatives from both communities. Through a large workshop, representatives 
from a number of governmental agencies came together to develop and discuss examples of national 
interests for civil defence. Continued work following the workshop revealed five key questions, each 
contributing towards a shared understanding of specific possibilities and limitations. The questions 
concerned issues of boundaries, contents, importance, location, and value, thereby providing input to a 
proposed sector description to be used when deciding whether to start handling actual national interest 
claims for civil defence or not. Through the work reported, the paper illustrates recurring challenges 
with handling divergent and shared meanings, balancing of logical and physical aspects, and bridging of 
means and ends in collaborative exploration. 
Keywords Collaborative exploration, Civil defence, National interests. 
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1 Introduction 
How our society use its resources and how we defend it are two areas of concern for many people. Not 
only professionals in each area, but also ordinary people care about their living environment and their 
safety. Despite different challenges and possibilities within the two areas, they can be seen to meet in 
the concept of resilience, especially from a large-scale and long-term strategic perspective. Resilience is 
commonly used to describe a wide range of complex systems (cf. Nelson et.al. 2007) and has been 
applied to for example individuals, organisations, and nations. Distinguishing between “stability” and 
“resilience”, Holling (1973) describes the latter property as “a measure of the persistence of systems and 
of their ability to absorb change and disturbances and still maintain the same relationships between 
populations or state variables” (ibid., p. 14).  
But how can the relationship between land-use planning and total defence work in practice, influencing 
strategic resilience? And how can this relationship be explored to collectively identify challenges and 
develop possibilities? Although allowances in Swedish law for letting both military and civil defence 
interests influence land-use planning have existed for some thirty years, these provisions have so far 
only been utilised by the military side. A legal framework of so-called national interests provides the 
possibility of taking into account also the civil side of total defence, along with a number of other sectors 
such as communications, cultural heritage, and industrial development (SFS 1998:808).  
1.1 Focus of paper 
In early 2017, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency procured an exploration project to be performed 
by a large consulting company. The company agreed to the task of developing a proposal for a so called 
sector description for the agency to use in deciding whether or not to begin utilising the national interest 
legislation for civil defence.  
This paper documents the design, execution, results and experiences of the project in the form of a case 
study (cf. Yin 2003). It covers the period from April to September 2017, when the work was performed 
by the author together with a consultant colleague and two representatives for the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency. The aim of the paper is to provide insights for those involved in land-use planning 
and total defence, as well as researchers interested in the collaborative exploration. The content of this 
paper represents the experiences of the author and does not necessarily correspond to the views of the 
agency.  
From a practical perspective, this work highlights issues of collaboratively working to define a joint 
domain of concern that brings together two disparate areas. It provides experiences and insights into 
the exploration of needs and solutions. It also enables results of interest for each area individually. From 
a theoretical perspective, the work identifies main challenges relevant to collaborative exploration 
efforts. It provides the opportunity to further the understanding of joint development across 
organisational and community boundaries by gradually utilising ideas from knowledge management, 
business development, and information systems development.  
1.2 Methodology and structure 
From a methodological point-of-view, the work undertaken has been driven by explicit requirements to 
practically support the agency in reaching the outcomes desired. Following this, the author has 
employed a clinical perspective of helping the client (Schein 1987), focusing on the issues at hand rather 
than applying a prescribed method or framework. The work can thus be seen as mainly empirically 
driven, based on a specific context and organisational setting. Instead of starting from theoretically 
derived propositions, the work has been guided by a bottom-up grounded theory-like approach (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967). Given the explorative character of the project, practical relevance has been stressed 
over theoretical rigor (cf. Keen 1991).  
All this has consequences for the content of the paper. To provide as rich insights as possible, the 
majority of the references used are the ones that directly appeared in the exploration project. A limited 
set of additional references have been added after the completion of the project, mostly in order to set 
the stage in this introduction and to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings influencing the work and 
the conclusions.  
Following this introduction, the remainder of the paper is structured in four main sections: background, 
workshop results, key questions, and conclusions. 
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2 Background  
Because the project brings together two areas, land-use planning and total defence, this section gives a 
background to each. Based on the larger context, the specific issues of each area are highlighted to set 
the stage for the project and its results. 
2.1 Land-use planning and national interests 
Planning the future of a society has many contributing aspects. A key aspect is land-use planning, deal-
ing with how we best make use of available land and water. The physical environment is shaped through 
various plans and ultimately decisions on different levels. Legislation provides the legal basis for han-
dling different interests in the planning process, prescribing principles, activities and documents. 
How a specific piece of land or water is being used over time is influenced by a number of planning 
decisions. These are governed by a range of laws regarding the development of facilities such as houses, 
roads, railways, airports, pipelines for natural gas, high-voltage electricity cables, etc. The particular 
regulations for each type of facility are guided by references to more overarching values and principles 
contained in the so called Environmental code (SFS 1998:808), Sweden’s core legislation in the envi-
ronmental area.  
As one means of balancing individual interests, the Environmental code details the concept of national 
interests. National interests are specified in two forms, both as particular geographic areas and as par-
ticular types of activities that may need protection. In total, there are twelve activity types that are can-
didates for national interests, and for each of them one or two governmental agencies are nominated for 
providing relevant information within their areas of responsibility (SFS 1998:896), as shown in table 1 
below. 
 
National interest Governmental agency  
Reindeer herding Sami Parliament 
Professional fishing Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
Natural heritage and outdoor life Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and 
Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
Cultural heritage Swedish National Heritage Board 
Geological prospecting Geological Survey of Sweden 
Industrial production Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth 
Energy production and distribution Swedish Energy Agency 
Nuclear waste deposition Swedish Radiation Safety Authority 
Communications Swedish Transport Administration and 
Swedish Post and Telecom Authority 
Waste management Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
Water supply Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
Total defence Swedish Armed Forces and 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
Table 1.  Overview of legislated types of national interests with nominated actors 
The governmental agency responsible for overseeing the whole national interest system is the National 
Board of Housing, Building and Planning, and they interact with each of the national interest agencies 
for each societal sector (Boverket 2013). Specifically, for the total defence sector, the legislation pre-
scribes that “Land and water areas of relevance for total defence shall as far as possible be protected 
from actions that significantly may counteract total defence interests. Areas that are of national interest 
because they are needed for total defence facilities shall be protected from actions that significantly may 
hinder the creation or use of the facilities” (SFS 1998:808, 3 chapter 9 §). 
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2.2 Total defence and civil defence 
For the last couple of years, the focus of defence issues in Sweden has increased. Beside the military side, 
this has meant a renewal of interest also for civil defence; the two together comprising what is known as 
total defence. According to relevant law, “Total defence are activities needed to prepare Sweden for war. 
To strengthen the defence capability of the country, the alert level can be heightened. Heightened alert 
is either high alert or highest alert. During highest alert, total defence is all societal activities that are to 
be performed. Total defence comprises military activities (military defence) and civil activities (civil 
defence)” (SFS 1992:1403, 1 §).  
The goal of civil defence consists of three mutually reinforcing parts: “Protect the civilian population, 
ensure the most important societal functions, and contribute to the Swedish Armed Forces’ capability 
during an armed attack or war in our surroundings” (Försvarsdepartementet 2015a, page 59). Rather 
than being linked to any particular organisation, civil defence focuses on activities that ultimately affect 
most actors in society. Therefore, the term “civil defence” can be seen as a shorthand for the “total 
defence’s civil parts”, and these two expressions are used as synonyms in the following.  
To emphasise the importance of civil defence, and the interaction with military defence, the Swedish 
government in 2015 decided to reinstate an overall total defence planning (Försvarsdepartementet 
2015b). Various assignments (Justitiedepartementet 2015; Försvarsdepartementet 2017) have there-
after been given to the two main governmental organisations involved in military and civil defence, 
respectively, i.e. the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. 
3 Workshop results 
An important part of the project was to arrange a larger workshop where participants concerned with 
national interest and civil defence could contribute. The idea was both to communicate the work cur-
rently underway, and to get input from the participants to delimit and characterise the sector. 
Invitations were sent to a number of governmental agencies and County Administrative Boards across 
Sweden. The participants were divided into five different groups, each comprising around 6-7 people 
representing their organisations. The background of the participants varied; some worked primarily 
with land-use planning whereas others had a focus on security and defence. 
A key task during the workshop was to have the participants discussing possible examples of national 
interests for civil defence. The group were asked to come up with examples, and for each example outline 
four aspects to describe it: Activity, Facility, Area, and Needs. Activity concerned the operations that the 
facility contributes to, whereas Facility concerned the type of construction used in the activity. Area 
concerned land or water area of importance, and Needs the reasons why the area is needed. A total of 14 
examples were generated by the participants collaborating in their groups, as shown in table 2 below. 
 
 Activity Facility Area Needs 
1 Transportation, 
supply 
Harbour Whole/parts of harbour 




2 Lab analyses, 
CBRNE 
Research facility Perimeter Transportation, 
protection 






4 Fuel supply Harbour, depot, 
refinery, truck & road, 
filling station 
Harbour area, depot 
area 










Command and control 
site and 
communications 
 Manage civil defence, 
support to Armed 
Forces  
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7 Supply  Harbour  Distribution, related 






and university hospital 
Buildings and 
surrounding land areas 




9 Electricity supply National, regional and 
local grid with nodes 
and control centres 
Areas in direct 




10 Protection of 
population during 
air raids 
Shelters Current shelters with 
room for expansion, 
areas for new shelters 
Existing shelters, 
proper use, maintain 
physical protection  
11 Coordination of 
operations 
Command and control 
site 
Small physical area Communication 
system (e.g. Tetra-
based), electricity 
12 Supply Bridge Small area (height above 
/ deep beneath) 
Ensure 
communications 
13 Fuel supply and 
storage 
Depot Large areas Transportation, fuel 
for backup power  
14 Electricity 
production 
Nuclear plant Land, water Transportation, 
cooling, protection, 
electricity 
Table 2.  Overview of examples produced by the participants of the workshop 
4 Key questions 
As described in the previous sections, material from the workshop was collected and analysed to get 
closer to a general sector description of National interest for civil defence, together with clarifying crite-
ria to support the identification and evaluation of specific candidates. However, a gap in perspective was 
identified during a quest to attract participants for a second – this time internal – workshop targeted at 
employees of the agency having a focus on civil defence. The realisation was that much of the commu-
nication in the project, as well as the sector description and criteria themselves, might be of a larger 
interest to the land-use planning community than that of civil defence.  
To close this gap, an extra step of analysis was inserted in order to form and address key questions of 
value for the civil defence community. This could be seen as an exercise in perspective switching, moving 
from the perspective of the solution (national interest) to the perspective of the need (civil defence). A 
total of five key questions were created from literature and workshop material and then answered. In 
addition to attracting the people interested in civil defence, the belief was also that the key questions, 
together with their answers, would contribute to a more usable sector description and corresponding 
criteria.  
In an analysis best characterised as abductive (cf. Fann 1970), rather than purely deductive or inductive, 
the set of questions was arrived at after repeatedly going back and forth between the contexts of national 
interests and civil defence. The five questions eventually formed around the boundaries of civil defence, 
the contents of civil defence, the idea of national-level importance, the meaning of location and 
confinement, and the value of national interest for civil defence. Each question is addressed in a separate 
sub section below. 
4.1 Boundaries of civil defence 
What “civil defence” is, and what it is not, is a key question for the successful application of the legislation 
of national interests. It is also important for people interested in the area, as well as the general public, 
especially following the increased attention over the last couple of years. How to delimit and define a 
widely used term such as civil defence is seldom uncontested, and there can be reasons for the bounda-
ries to be kept a bit vague, flexible and wide-ranging. Nevertheless, a shared awareness of the basic 
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boundaries towards other areas is particularly helpful when people from different work practices and 
knowledge communities need to work together.  
In defining civil defence, the initial focus will be on the second, main, part of the term and the boundary 
towards non-defence. “Defence” is used in different circumstances, and common dictionaries defines it 
along the lines of “the act or action of defending”, with “defend” meaning “to drive danger or attack away 
from” (Merriam-Webster n.d.). Hence, defence imply activities where somebody/something (the 
defender) defends somebody/something (the defendee) against somebody/something (the danger or 
attack). In practical use, “defence” often also covers related activities of preventing, planning, evaluating, 
improving, etc, the actual moments of defending.  
Analysing the broad range of activities that the term “defence” applies to, they can be projected along 
several dimensions. Most notable, this includes differences in scope and severity, and also whether the 
defence is aimed at somebody’s attack or something dangerous. Examples include an attack from foreign 
armed forces, a terrorist or a robber. Or the dangers of a pandemic, a flooding, or a domestic fire. Par-
tially because of the association of the term “defence” with specific organisations in most countries that 
represent some kind of armed defence forces, defence against foreign armed forces are often seen as 
more prototypical than defence against for example a domestic fire. As seen earlier, this is mirrored in 
the legislation for Sweden’s total defence where the first sentence read “Total defence are activities 
needed to prepare Sweden for war” (SFS 1992:1403). 
As there are no clear-cut boundaries between “defence” and for example “protection” and “prepared-
ness” the differences towards related terms are sometimes more of difference in degree than a difference 
in kind. The rough boundary implied by the legislation seem to be contextual and hinge on the societal 
situation, so that actual moments of defending only happens in situations of heightened alert, but that 
related activities of preventing, planning, evaluating, improving the defence may and should happen 
also in other situations. In the planning of the civil defence, the government noted that “it is important 
that lessons learned and resources from accident protection and emergency preparedness also are used 
for planning the civil defence. In several respects, the goal for emergency preparedness is matched by 
the goal for civil defence. However, the government believes that civil defence requires additional 
activities that have not been deemed necessary for emergency preparedness. This could for example 
include demands for certain protection activities, certain important society functions, and that scarce 
resources can be distributed to prioritised activities in heightened alert” (Försvarsdepartementet 2015a, 
page 60).  
Turning to the first part of the term “civil defence”, it is now possible to discuss the boundary towards 
other forms of defence, thereby further clarifying the delimitations of total defence’s civil parts. 
Potentially, the prefix “civil” could be used as a delimiter in each of the three different aspects of defence 
identified above: regarding either the defender, the defendee, or the danger/attack. Going back to the 
underlying legislation, where civil defence was described alongside military defence as the two parts 
comprising total defence (SFS 1992:1403), it is clear that the prefix is in fact a delimitation focusing on 
the first of these dimensions, distinguishing a certain type of defender. Military defence is hence per-
formed by armed forces whereas civil defence is performed by other, non-military, actors. The distinc-
tion between armed forces and civilians is defined in the Geneva Convention, especially protocol 1 
(United Nations 1977). However, please note that in the Geneva Convention, “civil” in “civil defence” is 
primarily used as a delimitation of the defendee, i.e. what is being defended, rather than of the defender.  
Notwithstanding the above, in the legislative context of national interests the precise division between 
civil and military defence is of no real significance as all of total defence is included, but rather a practical 
matter in terms of division of labour between different governmental organisations. For example, in the 
current claims for national interests for total defence, the Swedish Armed Forces states that “In the con-
cept military defence, also civil agencies within the defence sector are included, such as the Swedish 
Defence Research Agency, the National Defence Radio Establishment, and Swedish Defence Materiel 
Administration, whose interests the Swedish Armed forces represents” (Försvarsmakten 2015, page 4). 
Moreover, the Swedish Armed Forces also handles national interest claims regarding weather radar sta-
tions owned by Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, something that could change if Swe-
dish Civil Contingencies Agency were to begin handling civil defence national interests in the future. 
4.2 Contents of civil defence  
Whereas the first question about delimitation looked at civil defence more or less as a black box, the 
question of content opens up the box to look at its constituents. In the same way as an extensional 
definition complements an intensional definition, exploring the contents of civil defence can be as valu-
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able as defining its boundaries. Irrespectively of whether the exploration of content is aiming for a com-
plete list, or only a list of examples, the result can be helpful not only for finding and/or evaluating 
specific proposals for national interests, but also for understanding and developing civil defence for a 
wider audience. 
Different things that can be found within the boundaries of civil defence, and these can be divided in 
different ways. Because civil defence is ultimately about activities performed, focusing on the ways these 
activities are characterised and grouped will add to the insights into the contents of civil defence. As 
stated by the Swedish government, “Civil defence consists of activities that responsible actors performs 
to make it possible for society to deal with situations of heightened alert. Civil defence is therefore not 
an organisation. The activities are performed by governmental agencies, municipalities, counties, 
private businesses, and voluntary organizations” (Försvarsdepartementet 2015a, page 12). 
We will use the goal of Swedish civil defence mentioned earlier as a starting point, using its three parts. 
The first part, “protect the civilian population”, has been the traditional focus of civil defence after World 
War II. As noted above, the Geneva Convention embody this notion when it presents a list of specific 
tasks following the statement that “civil defence” means “the performance of some or all of the 
undermentioned humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian population against the dangers, 
and to help it to recover from the immediate effects, of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the 
conditions necessary for its survival” (United Nations 1977). 
The second part of the goal, “ensure the most important societal functions”, focus on the workings of 
society to make sure that its key activities are operating also in difficult times. In 2010, the Swedish 
government commissioned the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to develop a strategy for the 
protection of vital societal functions (MSB 2011). In the strategy, “a vital societal function is defined as 
a function of such importance that its loss or severe disruption to it could entail major risks or hazards 
for the life and health of the population, the functionality of society or society’s fundamental values” 
(MSB 2011, page 10). A total of 11 societal sectors, in which vital societal functions may be found, were 
identified: Energy supply; Financial services; Foodstuffs; Health, medical and care services; Information 
and communication; Public administration – management; Safety and security; Social insurance; 
Technical municipal services; Trade and industry; and Transport (MSB 2011, page 21). 
The third and final part of the goal, “contribute to the Swedish Armed Forces’ capability during an armed 
attack or war in our surroundings”, focus on areas where civil defence may support the military defence 
in certain circumstances. Relevant areas may of course vary over time, but some have been stated by the 
Government: “For example, transportation and logistics, supply of food, fuel, electricity and telecom-
munications, and access to healthcare resources will make up special needs for the military defence” 
(Försvarsdepartementet 2015a, page 108). 
 
Cooperation area Societal sector  









Protection, safety and security X X  
Protection, rescue 
and care 
Health, medical and care services X X X 
Economic 
security 
Financial services  
Social security  
Trade & industry 
 X  
Geographic 
responsibility 
Public administration  X  
Technical 
infrastructure 
Energy supply  
Information and communication  
Municipal technical services  
Foodstuffs 
 X X 
Transportation Transport  X X 
Table 3.  Overview of contents of civil defence based on cooperation areas 
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Having looked at each of the parts of the goal for civil defence, we can now turn to how relevant 
legislation structures the actual work. In addition to the provisions given to a number of governmental 
agencies, assigned as “responsible for monitoring” , a set of six different cooperation areas are used, 
where each of these agencies participate in one or more areas. The areas are Hazardous substances; 
Protection, rescue and care; Economic security; Geographic responsibility; Technical infrastructure; 
and Transportation (SFS 2015:1052). The legislation states that “In order to facilitate a holistic view in 
the planning for emergency preparedness and heightened alert, the planning for agencies listed in the 
appendix to this ordnance should be performed within cooperation areas” (SFS 2015:1052, 7 §). 
Table 3 above shows the contents of civil defence in terms of the six cooperation areas, alongside the 
societal sector(s) most closely matching, and the part(s) of the goal aimed at. Although precise 
delimitations are not strictly needed for working with national interests, the areas outlined contribute 
to make civil defence more concrete when identifying and evaluating claims for national interests. 
4.3 Importance on a national level 
One cornerstone of the general system of national interests is the idea that certain areas of the country 
are important on a national level. For civil defence, the importance of a geographical area is largely 
linked to the facilities that may be created or used on that location. Depending on how easy it is to qualify 
for an interest to be important on a national level, the number of claims for national interests can be 
expected to range from very few to an endless number.  
The governmental agency responsible for the national interest system – National Board of Housing, 
Building and Planning – outlines three general criteria for something being of national interest: large 
national value, committed internationally, or nationally important structures (Ryding 2017). Whereas 
the first and last case could be said to concern what is directly important to the population, the middle 
case concerns requirements to fulfil commitments the nation has made to other countries, thereby con-
cerning the population more indirectly.   
Looking more closely at the first case, this can be seen as the prototypical example of when something 
is of important on a national level. This represent the case when there are no, or only a few, alternatives 
available to something of value to the population. Examples could include the place where the national 
parliament resides, or a rocket launching range. Here the whole population, or a large portion thereof, 
could be said to be reliant on the specific area and its facilities.  
The third case opens up the possibility that something can be of national importance by virtue of being 
part of a larger structure. As noted by the representative of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency in 
this project, there are three different alternatives when also parts can be of national importance. One 
alternative concerns parts of physical infrastructures, for example a railroad station. The other alterna-
tive concerns parts of information infrastructures, for example a communication tower. The final alter-
native concerns decentralised parts with multiple forms of interaction among them, for example a hos-
pital.  
Although a specific part of a larger structure in itself may not be of value to the whole population, or a 
large portion thereof, its demise may have significant repercussions on a larger scale and thereby making 
it important also on a national level. In the context of national interests, this will perhaps require a bit 
more judgement compared to the first two cases where the direct or indirect value to a large portion of 
the population might be easier to establish. 
4.4 Location and confinement for civil defence 
When working with national interests, the question is not only if something is important on a national 
level, but also how confined and dependent it is on the particular location. Because national interests 
deals with specific areas of land and water, a key question is what this means for the activities being 
performed, whether it is the place for the national parliament or a hospital. Basically, the easier it is to 
move a civil defence activity to another location, the weaker the argument is to judge its current location 
as an area of national interest. 
In general, an activity can be more or less confined to a specific location. For example, it is easier to 
perform mental calculations in various locations than it is to launch a rocket into space. The main dif-
ference lies in the materials and surroundings needed to perform the activity. While some material is 
easy to move to another location, other is more permanently fixed. Prime examples of the latter are 
buildings, factories and infrastructure – hence the recurring focus on facilities in the context of national 
interests.  
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Compare the situations of performing healthcare at a fixed emergency hospital and at a mobile field 
hospital. Whereas the former requires considerable time, energy and money to move, the latter is less 
confined to its current location and can easier be moved to a different place. In addition to the confine-
ment due to the facilities and materials, the issue of surroundings can be equally challenging. Even if 
the time, energy and money to move can be mustered, there might be few, if any, alternative locations 
available. The same applies to cases of future facilities, where forthcoming civil defence activities may 
require new facilities in certain locations. 
4.5 Value of national interest for civil defence  
The final key question concerns when national interest is of value for civil defence. As with all tools, their 
value depends on the specific context and the needs within that context. For people engaged in civil 
defence, this means realising the specific advantages that national interest might have on the activities 
and goal of civil defence. But equally important, to understand the limitations, and possible drawbacks, 
of national interest in the context of civil defence.  
As described in this paper, the legislation for national interests is designed to influence the individual 
decisions made to change the utilisation of land and water. Whether related to a building permit for a 
new house, or the concession for a new highway, the decision makers are obliged to take existing national 
interests into account when making their decisions. For the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to take 
up the role of responsible for national interests for civil defence, there has to be enough advantages to 
top possible disadvantages.  
Starting with the pros, one advantage is that national interests might make future expansions easier for 
civil defence in existing locations. Or that additional facilities might become easier to establish in new 
locations. Another advantage is that national interests might make reduce the limitations posed on civil 
defence activities by changes in the surrounding environment. Or that the activities eventually become 
so negatively affected that the only alternative is for them to have to move. A third advantage is that 
national interests provides an opportunity for civil defence to examine and possibly rethink its activities 
and use of facilities. Exploring the conditions of national importance and confinement to specific 
locations, might yield important insights also when a possible claim for national interest turn out not to 
be applicable or beneficial. 
A possible disadvantage is that claims for national interests are tested anew in each decision, which 
means that there are no guarantees that they will prevail every time. Although national interests for civil 
defence carry more weight than other national interests, much of the outcome hinges on how well the 
interest is motivated. Another possible disadvantage is that the whole system of national interests is 
designed for transparency and openness. Although the Swedish Armed Forces have devised procedures 
for also handling secret facilities, the basic premise of national interests is that of non-secrecy. 
5 Conclusions 
In the project conducted, material for a sector description, together with accompanying criteria, have 
been developed. This was done through existing literature, a workshop with a large number of invited 
representatives for different governmental agencies, and recurring discussions within the project group. 
Putting the different fragments together yielded a proposed sector description along the following lines: 
“Civil defence comprises defence-related activities performed by civil actors during, and in preparation 
for, heightened alert. The activities are pertinent to the goal of civil defence, and are relevant for at least 
one of the cooperation areas for emergency preparedness and heightened alert. In cases where the 
activities are dependent on facilities and equipment not easily relocated, and they are directly or indi-
rectly important for a significant portion of Sweden’s population, appropriate areas of land or water are 
candidates for national interests for civil defence”. 
This paper has shown how data from two disparate areas have been used in a collaborative exploration 
effort to facilitate upcoming decisions and strengthen strategic resilience. These decisions include both 
the general one, whether to start handling actual national interest claims for civil defence, and if so, the 
specific decisions dealing with individual claims. In addition to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 
this collaboration also involves the other actors being represented at the reported workshop, since a 
successful solution will depend on the participation of a range of different actors. Although the sector 
description being evolved will embody a condensed version of the knowledge gained, many of the 
benefits with the project have to do with the underlying work to build a shared understanding between 
the two areas of land-use planning and total defence.  
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Fig. 1. Specific and general results of the project. 
As summarised by Figure 1, the paper has also provided more general insights into critical challenges 
arising in collaborative exploration efforts. First, this include challenges of sense-making (Weick 1979), 
with divergent meanings of common words used in both contexts, for example the notion of “protection”. 
In the context of civil defence, protection is primarily conceived against an adversary whose threats 
could have immediate consequences of destroyed property or lost lives. In national interests, protection 
is instead primarily conceived against official decisions that could have long-term consequences and 
ultimately lead to activities having to scale-down or relocate.  
Second, the paper illustrates the challenges of bridging logical and physical issues in development work, 
navigating the fundamental distinction between infological and datalogical aspects of the world 
(Langefors 1993). Whereas it often is important to be able to let go of physical constraints in order to 
realise underlying needs and devise new possibilities, many working solutions require physical artefacts 
and surroundings that exist in specific places and have specific characteristics.  
Third, the paper shows how the exploration of means and ends provides important challenges when 
problems are set and solved. Whether it is a new information system that provides benefits to a business 
(Markus and Keil 1994), or as in this case, a piece of legislation that can be used as a tool towards certain 
goals of an organisation or society in general. In each case, there is a need for ‘customers’ to express 
needs and requirements, and ‘suppliers’ to express value and benefits. 
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